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Direct democracy and subjective regime legitimacy in Europe 
 
Abstract 
While much research focuses on the causes and consequences of direct democracy and 
regime legitimacy, little attention has been paid to the potential relationship between them. 
In an attempt to fill this void, this paper focuses on the legal provisions for direct democracy 
and its use. The key argument is that possibilities for the public’s direct involvement reflect 
high importance given to citizens, openness of the regime towards different modes of 
decision-making, and ways to avoid unpopular institutions. Consequently, citizens are likely 
to accept and support the regime, improving or maintaining its legitimacy. The cross-
national analysis includes 38 European countries ranging from transition countries to 
established democracies. It uses bivariate statistical analysis and country-level data collected 
from legislation, secondary sources, and aggregate surveys. 
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Introduction 
In the last two decades, an extensive body of literature discusses the increasing disaffection 
of citizens with representative democracy. The existence of several problems in the process 
of political representation was reflected in citizens’ behaviour who gradually abandoned 
traditional proactive modes of involvement (e.g. electoral turnout, party membership) and 
oriented towards newer and more reactive forms of participation (e.g. protests, petitions). In 
light of these developments, scholars started speaking about a “democratic malaise” in 
which citizens become alienated from the political process. One possible solution to address 
this malaise has been the adoption of direct democracy procedures through which citizens 
receive a direct say in political decision-making.i A different strand of literature documents 
the decrease of regime legitimacy across the world. The recent street protests in Eastern or 
Southern Europe are only one indication of citizens’ attitudes and behaviours towards state 
authorities. While earlier studies have focused on the causes and consequences of direct 
democracy and regime legitimacy, little attention has been paid to the relationship between 
them.  
This paper tries to fill this empirical void and aims to identify a relationship between 
legislative provisions and use of direct democracy (measured as referendums, citizens’ 
initiative, agenda initiative, and recall procedures), on the one hand, and subjective regime 
legitimacy, on the other hand. The cross-national analysis includes 38 European countries 
ranging from transition countries to established democracies. It uses bivariate statistical 
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analysis and country-level data collected from legislation, secondary sources, and aggregate 
surveys. The central argument of this exploratory study is that possibilities for direct 
involvement of the public reflect high importance given to citizens, openness of the regime 
towards different ways of decision-making and ways to avoid unpopular institutions such as 
parties or the legislature. As a consequence of these benefits, citizens are likely to accept 
and support the regime, improving or maintaining its legitimacy.  
The first section reviews the existing approaches to legitimacy and outlines the 
conceptualization and measurement used in this study. This is followed by a discussion 
about direct democracy, its forms, and expectations regarding its relationship with 
legitimacy. The third section presents the variable operationalization, data and research 
method. The fourth section presents and interprets the empirical results of the analysis, 
while the conclusion discusses potential implications and avenues for further research. 
 
Conceptualizing and measuring subjective regime legitimacy 
Starting with Weber’s distinction between authority and coercion, the concept of legitimacy 
pertains to how power may be used by state institutions and how citizens react  to it.ii In 
defining authority, Weber refers to the legitimate use of power that citizens accept and act 
upon orders given to them because they consider this to be appropriate behaviour.iii 
Legitimacy can be defined in a broad sense as “the capacity of a political system to engender 
and maintain the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for 
the society”.iv Legitimacy is defined as a sum of three components: conformity to established 
rules, justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs, and the expressed consent of 
the people.v  
These definitions point in the direction of two distinct approaches towards 
legitimacy. On the one hand, there is the system level, normative or objective legitimacy 
relating to the working principles and functioning of state institutions with emphasis on 
decision-making and exercise of power.vi On the other hand, we have a grassroots 
descriptive or subjective legitimacy referring to the public assessment of the relevance and 
quality of institutional performance. A regime is legitimate as long as the population 
perceives it as such. State institutions’ conformity to rules has no effect if citizens do not 
believe those rules to be legitimate. If they are not justified in the terms of shared beliefs, 
the population is likely to reject institutions and withdraw its support. In brief, this type of 
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legitimacy is evaluative in that citizens decide if political institutions are acceptable.vii These 
value-based judgments of obeying state institutions are then translated into behaviours of 
compliance with laws and regulations.viii The descriptive approach towards legitimacy 
substantively covers the subject (population), object (state institutions), and the relationship 
between the two (attitudes and behaviours as effects of institutional features). This paper 
uses the subjective perspective and defines regime legitimacy as citizen evaluations of the 
state institutions’ ability to rightfully hold and exercise political power. Essentially, it refers 
to the degree of popular acceptance, consent and support of a specific system of 
governance.  
The subjective legitimacy includes notions such as political support or trust. Easton 
explains that “legitimacy is a distinct form of political support that concerns evaluations of 
the state from a public or ‘common good’ perspective”.ix This means that citizens have the 
ability to identify their common interests and develop standards to assess the performance 
of state institutions with regard to those interests. The degree to which citizens’ standards 
are achieved determine the degree of legitimacy. This complex process cuts across the forms 
of support for state institutions and elites (specific) or for political community and regime 
(diffuse). Institutional trust is a useful concept but too narrow to make it an equivalent of 
legitimacy. Earlier studies have shown that trust is usually an assessment of authorities’ 
performance and/or competencex or a belief that institutions are motivated to rightfully and 
fairly deliver what they promise.xi People are likely to support those state institutions 
producing the goods and services expected of them. In addition, legitimacy refers to the 
acceptance of general norms and principles of the political system.xii This is where the notion 
of diffuse support, conceptualized as an established set of attitudes towards politics and its 
functioning, comes into play.xiii  
The combination of these two types of political support leads to a multi-dimensional 
structure of legitimacy. Gilley has partly followed this path and measured legitimacy through 
three components referring to citizens’ views and acceptance of government legality, 
justification of the government, and consent to the government.xiv While the three 
indicators are useful, the main shortcoming of his approach is the absence of regime-
oriented attitudes. His operationalization brings legitimacy too close to the array of specific 
support. While his choice is understandable given the large number of analysed countries – 
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where only few common indicators were available – it is less justifiable from a theoretical 
perspective.  
Booth and Seligson have solved this problem by looking at attitudes at a second layer, 
that is the political system. Their measurement of legitimacy used six dimensions: support 
for core regime principles; recognition of a political community; evaluation of regime 
performance; support for political institutions; support for local government; and support 
for political elites.xv In measuring subjective legitimacy, this paper follows Booth and 
Seligson’s methodology after removing the latter two indicators for which survey data is 
scarce (support for local government) or are already reflected in the evaluation of regime 
performance or support for political institutions (support towards political elites). 
Consequently, this paper considers legitimacy as a function of four types of attitudes: 1) 
acceptance of core regime principles; 2) evaluation of regime performance; 3) support for 
political institutions and 4) support for institutions of authority.  
 
Direct democracy and subjective regime legitimacy 
The gradual weakening of representative democracy has raised demands for alternative 
opportunities for political involvement. The message conveyed in the previous section is that 
regime legitimacy depends upon the popular acceptance of institutional procedures, 
behaviours, and outcomes. If the public suspects the decision-making process in their 
country to be corrupted, legitimacy suffers. Thus, if citizens consider that the degree of their 
influence over policy-making is low, legitimacy is likely to be also low. In representative 
democracies elections are the crucial mechanism that guarantees citizens’ involvement. 
However, elections rarely provide effective opportunities for citizens to influence policy-
making.
xviii
xvi Elections allow citizens to choose between several intermediaries who promise to 
aggregate and represent their interests. Essentially, they are contests between political 
competitors – parties or candidates – with general promises, often fairly similar, that are 
seldom pursued after elections. Moreover, even when choices between competitors are 
meaningful electoral results do not always reflect the popular will, being artificially 
influenced by the rules of the game, that is the electoral system.xvii As a result, it is not 
surprising that there is growing public dissatisfaction with the system of representative 
democracy  and citizens have become impatient with intermediaries between their 
opinions and public policies.xix In this sense, representative mechanisms are not replaced but 
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rather complemented by different means of citizens’ political engagement.xx The arguments 
in this section refer to how the presence of direct democracy may have an impact on 
perceived regime legitimacy.  
The starting point is the observation that direct democracy tools may promote policy 
legitimacy for decisions where representative channels are insufficient.
xxiii
xxi There are sensitive 
issues such as fundamental aspects of self-identity (e.g. values, rights and liberties, 
sovereignty) that require major changes in society. Such changes can hardly be accepted if 
debates only take place among political elites in parliament without the participation of civil 
society. Direct democracy tools used to settle the issues are not meant to avoid debates and 
conflict, but to add legitimacy:xxii The involvement of citizens and use of direct democratic 
instruments can legitimize these changes. At the same time, representative institutions and 
politicians try to use some direct democracy tools to legitimize their policies, augment their 
authority, strengthen their positions, and win back citizens.  Elites may control some of the 
direct democratic practices and submit to referendum issues that they are certain they will 
win,xxiv but the use of direct democracy tools can nevertheless enhance the popular 
involvement in representative mechanisms. For example, the organization of a referendum – 
on a sensitive or salient issue in society – at the same time with a candidate race is likely to 
attract more people to the polls compared to regular elections. This particular setting can 
diminish voter apathy because it combines two ways of policy influence. Moreover, 
candidates can take stances on the matter debated in the referendum and thus determine 
particular segments of the electorate to turn out and vote for them.  
 As a second possible linkage between direct democracy and subjective legitimacy, 
the former can link citizens’ preferences to political decisions and thus compensate for some 
of the shortcomings that characterize representative democracy. Over the last five decades 
the changing social trends have fostered the development of a large category of critical 
citizens.
xxvii
xxv This category rejects the guidance of representative institutions and criticizes 
them either for deficiencies in delivering the expected goods and services, or for their 
redundant tasks. While political parties simplify choices, an increasing share of the 
population welcomes the possibility to express non-mediated preferences, especially that 
many know how to vote on issues of interest to them.xxvi Citizens enjoy their involvement in 
decision-making and thus more direct democracy leads to more satisfaction with the 
system.   
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 When representative institutions do not live up to the expectations of the public, 
direct democracy may alter the degree of discontent by favouring the emergence of a 
(partial) system of self-governance.xxviii
xxxii
 The latter allows the pursuit of interests and 
preferences that may (for various reasons) be excluded from representative politics. For 
example, in a representative democracy a salient issue for the population only makes it to 
the public agenda if the political elites decide to politicize it and take further action. Direct 
democracy complements these possibilities and provides citizens an opportunity to express 
preferences about policies. Earlier studies showed that direct democracy fosters policy 
outcomes closer to voters’ preferencesxxix, and referendums sometimes stopped 
governments from enacting changes faster than favoured by citizens.xxx In brief, the publicity 
of decision-making fosters the accountability of representative institutionsxxxi, and the 
openness of the regime towards direct democracy tools is likely to boost popular evaluations 
of legitimacy.  
Furthermore, unlike representative democracy that was considered too hierarchical, 
bureaucratic, and partisan, direct democracy may be able to deal effectively with questions 
of popular sovereignty or social exclusion. For example, some voters see their preferences 
discarded when the parties for which they voted are not large enough to participate in 
policy-making, that is fail to gain access to parliament. The disappointment may lead to 
exclusion from participation in the next elections. Direct democracy tools reduce the 
likelihood of such situations by allowing citizens to express their preferences although they 
are in minority, e.g. through initiatives.xxxiii
xxxiv
 Contrary to the case of elections presented 
above, direct participation may lead to a cohesive society with limited exclusion.  
All these arguments suggest that direct democracy tools are likely to shape the 
subjective regime legitimacy in a country. The theoretical linkages presented above suggest 
that the relationship between these two variables can be detected both at the level of 
normative regulations and of practical use. The normative regulations reflect the availability 
of direct democracy tools for the citizens of a country and may have two types of effects. 
The first type is a psychological effect that provides a message of system openness to 
citizens, willingness to listen to their voices, and provisions of alternative ways to participate 
in the political process. Thus, the existence of such regulations transcends the conditions to 
activate the mechanisms of direct democracy, e.g. top-down, bottom-up
xxxvi
xxxv, or their 
envisaged outcomes.  In essence, they are expected to have a positive effect on subjective 
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regime legitimacy because they make complementary means of citizens’ engagement 
available.  
At the same time, there is also a mechanical effect of the legislative provisions about 
direct democracy: their practical use. Once they become available citizens can use such tools 
to make their voice heard and eventually improve the quality of democracy. When direct 
democracy tools are used people are likely to understand their functions and see how they 
complement existing mechanisms of representative democracy. Moreover, accumulative 
experience with direct democracy may create a precedentxxxvii and the use of such tools can 
hardly be avoided when reaching important decisions in society, that is they limit the 
government’s room for manoeuver. Following these arguments, three hypotheses are 
formulated and tested in the empirical section of this paper – two refer to the normative 
regulations and one to the empirical use of direct democracy:  
 
H1: The existence of many direct democracy tools at national level is associated with high 
regime legitimacy. 
 
H2: The existence of many direct democracy tools at local level is associated with high regime 
legitimacy. 
 
H3: The use of many referendums at national level is associated with high regime legitimacy. 
 
The first two hypotheses differentiate between regulations at local and national level for 
theoretical and empirical reasons. First, local level direct democracy tools are expected to 
have a separate effect on legitimacy than those at national level because citizens behave 
differently when it comes to local politics. They are concerned about problems in their 
community and know that direct involvement in the decision-making process can bring 
change. At national level, only salient issues attract the interest of citizens who are also 
aware that their involvement has marginal influence due to the high number of voters. 
Moreover, as will be illustrated in the empirical section, some countries adopted local direct 
democracy in the absence of such tools at national level (e.g. Belgium, Germany), while 
others have national level direct democracy and are less concerned with what happens at 
local level.  
The third hypothesis looks at the use of national level referendums as an indicator for 
de facto use of direct democracy for operationalization reasons. Referendums are organized 
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either because they are a) mandatory, as it is the case with EU accession or constitutional 
changes in some countries, b) initiated by state institutions (parliamentary majority, 
president), or c) initiated by citizens. They are always organized and both successful and 
unsuccessful outcomes matter. Unlike referendums, the other three types of direct 
democracy – citizen initiative, agenda initiative, and recall – are difficult to measure. Here, 
we can only take successful outcomes into consideration, e.g. when a citizens’ initiative is 
subjected to vote. Since unsuccessful attempts can only be counted in some countries and 
not everywhere, this introduces bias. At the same time, local level referendums are too 
numerous to count and there is no reliable information on their numbers across countries 
and time.  
Consistent with previous approaches from the literature this paper considers four 
types of direct democracy: referendums (including plebiscites), citizens’ initiatives, agenda 
initiatives, and recall.xxxviii
xxxix
 In referendums the public votes on a proposal put on the ballot by 
the state institutions (government, legislature, president) or initiated by citizens  (provided 
such referendums are possible). The citizens’ initiative refers to proposals submitted by 
citizens to the legislature; if the latter does not act on the proposal the initiative may be 
submitted to popular vote (referendum) alone or with a competing measure proposed by 
state authorities. Agenda initiatives bypass the Parliament and citizens make a legislative 
proposal on which they vote after circulating a petition. The recall procedure means that 
citizens vote to remove a representative or a whole body (executive or legislative) from 
office, either at local or national level.   
 
Research Design 
The analysis is conducted at country level for a total number of 38 European countries. The 
research sample results from  excluding authoritarian regimesxl (e.g. Azerbaijan, Belarus, or 
Russia), countries with different rules for segments of population (Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
micro statesxli (e.g. Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino) and cases for which (reliable) data 
were not available (e.g. Cyprus, Israel, or Turkey). There is a geographical balance between 
Western and Eastern Europe (each 19 cases) and countries of various sizes are included 
(Germany and the UK at one extreme and Iceland and Luxembourg at the other). The 
research sample includes countries with various degrees of democracy – that is consolidated 
democracies, new democracies, and democratizing countries – to compare the relationship 
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between direct democracy and subjective legitimacy in various contexts. The existence of 
inter- and intra-regional variation is the reason for which this analysis includes also 
comparisons between Western and Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the hypothesis testing will 
differentiate between the two regions and the interpretation of results will also refer to 
intra-regional variations. The countries included in analysis are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.  
 
Variable operationalization 
Subjective regime legitimacy is best captured through survey data. I use data from the 4th 
wave of the European Values Study (2008). This survey is not randomly chosen, being from 
the last year before the financial crisis: the crisis is likely to influence regime legitimacy 
especially that income levels (GDP/capita) are almost deterministic.
xliii
xlii While survey data is 
collected at individual level, the aggregation at country level required several steps that are 
briefly explained below. Subjective regime legitimacy includes four types of attitudes; for 
each of them two indicators are used. The acceptance of core regime principles – basic rules 
of democracy – is operationalized as the rejection of a strong leader who does not need the 
legislature to rule and the rejection of army rule. The evaluation of regime performance uses 
two indicators: satisfaction with democracy and an assessment of how good or bad the 
current government is. The support for political institutions is measured as citizens’ support 
for parliament and government.  The support for institutions of authority is measured as 
people’s support for police and justice system.  
 Most of these eight indicators (two for every type of attitudes) were measured in the 
survey on a four-point scale to capture the degree of support and acceptance. To aggregate 
them, I recoded each dichotomously to have value 0 for no acceptance, no support, or 
negative assessment and 1 for acceptance, support, or positive evaluation (see Appendix 1). 
The next step was the creation of an index of legitimacy that included the eight indicators, 
equally weighed (minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 8). Each respondent from the 
38 analysed countries had a score on this nine-point index. Legitimacy at country level is 
measured as the average score of individuals in that country. The standard deviations of the 
28 
averages are fairly similar and therefore it is not necessary to standardize them. As a 
supplementary check, the correlation coefficient between these averages and the lowest 
quartile of the index at country level is 0.94, statistically significant at 0.01. The distribution 
of average legitimacy between countries ranges between 2.19 in Bulgaria and 6.20 in 
Denmark. 
The first two hypotheses refer to the existence of regulations about direct democracy 
at national and local levels until 2008 (to coincide with the survey for the dependent 
variable): referendums (mandatory and optional), citizens’ initiative, agenda initiative, and 
recall. Both variables, local and national level direct democracy, are count measures with 1 
given for the existence of one tool. A country with legislation for all five direct democracy 
tools at national level gets a score of 5 on the national level variable (referendum is split in 
mandatory and optional). If it has legal provisions for all tools at the local level it gets a sore 
of 10 on the local level variable (local and regional levels are counted together). Data comes 
primarily from the Direct Democracy Database available on the website of International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). For the countries that are not 
included in this database or for which information was incomplete or missing, data comes 
from reports, earlier studies, or other databases such as Navigator to Direct Democracy (see 
sources in Table 1). Whenever possible, I triangulated the information for all countries to 
make sure that the information is accurate. The measurement of regulations for direct 
democracy at the local level raises some difficulties since in federal countries (e.g. Germany, 
Switzerland) there are some differences between the states. In practice these differences 
are quite small and most of them provide fairly similar provisions of direct democracyxliv; the 
main differences occur in terms of conditions to use these tools. In these particular countries 
the number of direct democracy provisions at local level reflects the most common number 
at state level.  
 The use of referendums at national level (H3) is calculated with a formula that 
accounts for the number of referendums (defined as a question / issue put to a vote), what 
happens after the vote (binding or not), and how easy a referendum can succeed (required 
quorum)xlv:  
 
�
Rc2  × q� + [Rb  × q] 
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Note: Rc = the number of consultative referendums;Rb = the number of binding referendums; 
q = the required quorum. 
 
Binding referendums are weighed twice as much as consultative because citizens have a 
much stronger voice if their decisions have to be directly implemented rather than being re-
examined by an institution.xlvi In light of the arguments presented in the previous section, 
this should have a higher impact on subjective regime legitimacy. The quorum may be 
different for the two types of referendums and has three values: (1) for both turnout and 
approval quorums, (2) turnout quorum only, and (3) no quorum required. The reason behind 
this ordinal ranking is that very permissive legislation (no quorums) can increase the number 
of referendums compared to situations where both approval and turnout quorums are 
required. These scores are calculated for the referendums organized between 1990 (to 
ensure comparability between Western and Eastern Europe) and 2008. This indicator ignores 
the difference between top-down and bottom-up initiated referendums because citizens 
cannot use bottom-up referendums if they are not included in the country’s legislation.  
 The low number of cases does not allow sophisticated quantitative analyses. At the 
same time, the goal of this paper is exploratory and intends to identify the existence of 
relationships between direct democracy and regime legitimacy. This can be done with 
bivariate analyses in the form of correlations presented in the following section.  
 
Findings 
The general descriptive statistics shed light on the extent to which direct democracy tools 
are regulated in the 38 analysed countries. Table 1 presents six categories according to the 
number of legislative provisions both at national and local level. At national level, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Germany, and Norway do not allow for any direct involvement of citizens. In 
spite of the absence of provisions, ad-hoc referendums are possible and they were organized 
in three out of the four countries: Belgium approved the monarchy, while the Czech Republic 
and Norway had referendums about EU accession. The least populated category is the other 
extreme with only one country (Slovakia) having provisions for each direct democratic tool 
at national level. Most of the countries have legislation about either two or three direct 
democracy tools at national level. The countries with inclusive legislation about direct 
democracy (four or five) come from Eastern Europe. This is not surprising since many post-
communist countries have opted for participatory constitutions following the regime change 
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in the early 1990s. This option for inclusive and direct citizen participation was partly a 
reaction to the decades of authoritarianism. For some of them, the way in which the 
institutional change took place is illustrative for their choice. For example, in Hungary, the 
negotiations regarding the transfer of power between communists and opposition took the 
form of Round Table Talks where 50 delegates and 500 experts formed committees and sub-
committees. The whole process involved approximately 1,000 documented meetings for 
three months.xlvii Another example is Slovakia where the “velvet divorce” from the Czech 
Republic in 1993 has involved some consultations with the masses.  
At the local level there is a similar distribution of relatively few countries in the 
extreme categories (“none” and “five or more”) and quite many countries clustered in the 
categories of two and four provisions. Although there are more categories at the local than 
at the national level (regulations for both regional and community level were added), more 
than 80% of the countries have a maximum number of four provisions in their legislation. 
The two countries with nine provisions (included in the column “five or more”) for direct 
democracy at local level are federal – Germany and Switzerland. At the other extreme, 
Lithuania is the only country with no tools for direct democracy at local level. Sometimes, 
the legislation does not explicitly mention the possibility for direct involvement of citizens, 
but allows room for manoeuver. For example, in Belgium the constitution reads that state 
institutions at local level are responsible for decision-making and local authorities cannot be 
compelled by citizens in the exercise of their responsibilities. However, this did not impede 
local authorities to organize consultative referendums on particular matters. More recently, 
these regulations became explicit and citizen initiatives and optional referendums were 
included at regional and community levels. In Denmark the local authority can decide 
without the approval of a higher administrative institution to hold consultative referendums 
although there is no provision in the legislation.   
 
**Table 1 about here** 
 
The correlation between the provisions for direct democracy at national and local level is 
negative (-0.20, not statistically significant).xlviii This value indicates a weak tendency of 
countries with no or few direct democracy provisions at national level to have legislation on 
(more) direct democracy tools at local level. The most obvious example in this case is 
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Germany with no direct democracy tool at national level but with nine at local level. France, 
Luxembourg and Poland are other examples of countries following this pattern. The 
reciprocal is also valid: Countries with extensive provisions at national level provide fewer 
opportunities to their citizens to get involved at local level. Examples are Lithuania and 
Macedonia, each has four provisions at national level and none at local level. The correlation 
has a different sign and strength when dividing the sample according to the geographical 
location. For Western Europe the coefficient is very small (0.05) indicating the absence of an 
empirical relationship. In Eastern Europe the coefficient is negative (-0.33) indicating a 
medium tendency of countries with more provisions for direct democracy at national level to 
allow less involvement of citizens in decision-making at local level, e.g. Hungary, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, or Serbia.  
Similarly to the legislative provisions for direct democracy, the use of referendums 
has broad variations between the examined countries. The score obtained from the formula 
presented in the research design section ranges between 0 in countries like Bulgaria, Greece 
or Iceland to 360 in Switzerland.  
 
A Complex Picture 
Table 2 summarizes the correlation coefficients for the three hypothesized relationships. The 
bivariate statistical analyses for all European countries indicate empirical support for H2 and 
H3. At the same time, evidence goes against H1 (-0.45, statistically significant at the 0.01 
level): Levels of regime legitimacy are lower in countries with more provisions for direct 
democracy at national level; this is in general driven by East European countries that have 
extensive provisions for direct democracy. The scatterplot in Appendix 2 shows a negative 
monotonic and linear relationship.  
 
**Table 2 about here** 
 
This is in general driven by East European countries that have extensive provisions for direct 
democracy. For illustrative purposes Figure 1 includes a comparison of direct democracy 
provisions (grey dots) and regime legitimacy (black dots) in new EU member states from 
Eastern Europe (these are 10 out of the 19 East European countries in the analysis). The 
comparison between these 10 countries is relevant because their democratic performances 
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were officially acknowledged in 1999 when the EU initiated the accession process; two of 
them – Bulgaria and Romania – were late joiners due to delayed reforms. The negative 
relationship can be easily observed also within this small group: countries with few 
provisions (Estonia, Poland, or Slovenia) have high levels of legitimacy, while some countries 
with many provisions (Lithuania) have relatively low levels of legitimacy.  
 
**Figure 1 about here** 
 
Regarding H2, there is a positive relationship between direct democracy provisions at local 
level and regime legitimacy (0.22). The scatterplot in Appendix 2 shows a monotonic 
relationship between the two variables in which there are only few countries with very little 
or many (more than five) provisions at local level. As the correlation between national and 
local level provisions for direct democracy was negative (see the previous section), it is quite 
intuitive to have a different relationship with regime legitimacy. At the local level, West 
European countries have more legislative provisions and proportionally higher levels of 
regime legitimacy than countries from Eastern Europe (where there appears to be no 
relationship between direct democracy provisions at local level and legitimacy). To illustrate 
this relationship in Western Europe Figure 2 includes 10 countries selected on the basis of 
their geographical position (three from the northern part, four from centre, and three from 
the southern part). The provisions for direct democracy at local level (grey dots) are minimal 
in Norway and Portugal and quite extensive in Germany and Switzerland. Regime legitimacy 
(black dots) is quite homogenous among these countries especially when compared with the 
legitimacy for Eastern Europe in Figure 1. The distribution of the 10 countries on these two 
variables indicates the existence of a positive relationship. Countries with high numbers of 
provisions (Spain, France, Germany, and Switzerland) have higher levels of legitimacy than 
countries with few provisions (Portugal, Italy). It is noteworthy that Norway and the 
Netherlands, both with very high levels of legitimacy, have few legal provisions for direct 
democracy. This observation takes us back to the theoretical expectations and provides one 
possible explanation for the few provisions in some West European countries. These 
countries in which legitimacy is high – and has been high for decades – have little incentives 
to promote direct democracy tools at national level.  
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**Figure 2 about here** 
 
Finally, there is empirical support for H3: In countries that use more referendums (binding 
and easy to pass) the levels of regime legitimacy are higher than in the rest of cases. The 
correlation coefficient has an average value of 0.28 with consistent positive signs in both 
regions. In Eastern Europe the coefficient is considerably higher (0.48, statistically significant 
at 0.05) than in Western Europe (0.26).xlix This result tells a complex story when 
corroborated with the findings from H1. According to the latter, many legislative provisions 
about direct democracy at national level correspond to low legitimacy. As the use of 
referendums is positively associated with legitimacy, it results that direct democracy does 
not contribute to legitimacy if it is only on paper. The mere existence of provisions without 
practical implementation may not be perceived as alternative means of involvement. This is 
particularly observable in Eastern Europe where the high number of provisions was not 
backed by practical use: The bivariate correlation between provisions at the national level 
and use of referendums in Eastern Europe shows no relationship between the two; the value 
of the coefficient is 0.01.  
 The implementation of direct democracy is a possible explanation for the different 
results provided by H1 and H2, since local level direct democracy rarely remains only on 
paper. Although it is difficult to quantify the exact amount of tools used at local level, there 
are many examples showing that it is practiced in different communities across countries. As 
the existence of regulations at the local level is often accompanied by implementation, it 
differs significantly from what encountered at national level.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper tried to identify a relationship between direct democracy and regime legitimacy 
in 38 European countries. The main results indicate that provisions for direct democracy at 
local level and use of referendums at national level are positively associated with legitimacy. 
The negative correlation between provisions for direct democracy at national level and 
legitimacy may be explained through the absence of implementation. The major conclusion 
of these findings is that tools of direct democracy may have an impact on regime legitimacy 
when they are applied. When provisions remain solely on paper, direct democracy does not 
trigger the expected attitudes among citizens. Equally important, this paper showed that 
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there are some differences between Eastern and Western Europe. Relative to the legislative 
regulations, the relationships with subjective regime legitimacy go in different directions, 
while in terms of practical use the observed mechanisms are fairly similar but much stronger 
among the countries with lower degrees of democratization. 
 This analysis is preliminary in its conclusions. Its exploratory goals were primarily 
meant to identify an empirical relationship and to draw attention to a possible explanation 
for the variation of regime legitimacy in Europe. Its major implication for the broader study 
of subjective regime legitimacy is theoretical. The results give sufficient reason to include 
direct democracy as a source of subjective legitimacy in future analytical frameworks. The 
availability and use of tools to circumvent representative democracy appears to improve the 
perceptions of citizens towards the political system. While nuances are likely to occur 
depending on the country context, the comparative analysis revealed general mechanisms at 
work. Accordingly, direct democracy does not appear only as a cure for the malaise of 
representative democracies but also a potential factor to boost legitimacy. On empirical 
grounds, this study has produced evidence to account for synchronic differences between 
levels of legitimacy. The indicators used to assess levels of legitimacy can be replicated in 
several contexts and at various analytical levels, i.e. country, institutional, or individual.  
Moving beyond the relationships presented here, more empirical evidence is 
required to determine the causal mechanism through which direct democracy tools offer 
citizens incentives to increase their perception about regime legitimacy. In-depth analyses 
on several countries (e.g. crucial cases) complemented by qualitative interviews with citizens 
may explain how the latter increase their perception about legitimacy via alternatives to 
representative democracy. An additional further task could be a comparison between the 
direct democratic practices at national and local level; in that sense it is required to 
assemble a database on local level referendums, which is currently absent. Further research 
can also investigate the issue of reverse causation, i.e. low levels of legitimacy may lead to 
the adoption of direct democracy tools. In this sense, subjective regime legitimacy can be 
better understood as soon as the correspondence between formal provisions of direct 
democracy and practices is established.  
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Figure 1: National level direct democracy and regime legitimacy in Eastern Europe (EU NMS). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Local level direct democracy and regime legitimacy in Western Europe. 
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Table 1: The distribution of direct democracy tools at national and local level in Europe 
 Number of direct democracy provisions 
 None One Two Three Four Five & more 
National 
level 
Belgium 
Czech 
Republic 
Germany 
Norway 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
 
Armenia 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Poland 
Slovenia 
United 
Kingdom 
Albania 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Malta 
Moldova 
Portugal 
Romania 
Spain 
Switzerland 
Ukraine 
Lithuania 
Macedonia 
Montenegro  
Serbia 
 
Slovakia 
Local level Lithuania 
 
Armenia 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Macedonia 
Serbia 
 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Greece 
Malta 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Norway 
Portugal 
United 
Kingdom 
Albania  
Czech 
Republic 
Finland 
Georgia 
Italy 
Latvia 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Iceland 
Luxembourg 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
France 
Germany 
Poland 
Spain 
Switzerland 
Ukraine 
Sources: Büchi (2012), Council of Europe (1993), Council of Europe (2008), Democracy International, 
(2011), Direct Democracy Navigator, Governance Committee Council of Europe (2011), IDEA Direct 
Democracy Database, Qvortrup (2011), Sustainable Governance Indicators, Svensson (2012).  
 
Table 2: The correlation between direct democracy and subjective regime legitimacy 
 All Countries Western Europe Eastern Europe 
Provisions of Direct Democracy at National 
Level 
-0.45** -0.11 -0.16 
Provisions of Direct Democracy at Local Level 0.22 0.11 0.03 
Use of National Referendums 0.28 0.26 0.48* 
Notes: For provisions reported coefficients are Spearman (for ordinal variables). 
 For use of referendums reported coefficients are Pearson (for interval ratio). 
* p > 0.05; ** p > 0.01.  
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Appendix 1: The operationalization of subjective regime legitimacy 
Dimension Item Question Answers Code 
 
Acceptance of core 
regime principles 
Attitude against 
strong leader 
Q66.A: Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with 
parliament and elections 
Very good 
Fairly good 
Fairly bad 
Very bad 
0 
Attitude against army 
rule 
Q66.C Having the army rule the country 1 
 
 
 
Evaluation of regime 
performance 
 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
 
Q64: On the whole are you (answer options) with the way democracy is 
developing in our country? 
Very satisfied 
Rather satisfied 
Not very satisfied 
Not at all satisfied 
1 
 
0 
Good vs. Bad 
Government  
Q65: People have different views about the system for governing this 
country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very 
bad; 10 means very good 
1-5 0 
6-10 1 
 
Support for political 
institutions 
Support for legislature Q63: Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in 
Parliament. 
A great deal 
Quite a lot 
Not very much 
None at all 
1 
Support for 
Government 
Q63.R: Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have 
in Government. 
0 
Support for 
institutions of 
authority 
Support for police Q63.F: Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have 
in the police. 
A great deal 
Quite a lot 
Not very much 
None at all 
1 
Support for justice Q63.N: Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have 
in the justice system. 
0 
1 
Appendix 2: Scatter plots for the correlations in H1 and H2 
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